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ABSTRACT  
This paper applies the Event Analysis for Systemic Teamwork (EAST) method to an example 
of military command and control.  EAST offers a way to describe system level 'emergent 
properties' that arise from the complex interactions of system components (human and 
technical).  These are described using an integrated methods approach and modelled using 
Task, Social and Knowledge networks.  The current article is divided into three parts: a brief 
description of the military command and control context, a brief description of the EAST 
method, and a more in depth presentation of the analysis outcomes.  Numerous findings 
emerge from the application of the method.  These findings are compared with similar 
analyses undertaken in civilian domains, where Network Enabled Capability (NEC) is already 
in place.  The emergent properties of the military scenario relate to the degree of system 
reconfigurability, systems level Situational Awareness (SA), team-working and the role of mediating technology.  It is argued that the EAST method can be used to offer several 
interesting perspectives on designing and specifying NEC capability in military contexts.   
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INTRODUCTION 
Emergent properties exist where the “characteristics of the whole are developed (emerge) 
from the interactions of their components in a non-apparent way” (Bar Yam, 1997).  It 
reflects a focus on the systems level (that of aggregate behaviour) rather than the structural 
level (and the behaviour of individual components).  Emergent behaviour arises out of 
synergy, which is the product of interaction at a component level.  Arguably, the goal of any 
command and control system is to maximise this synergistic effect (Stanton et al., 2005).   
Command and control scenarios are a particular analytical challenge.  They are an instance 
where people and technology form a joint cognitive system (Hollnagel, 1993) so that “When 
the [structure] is put to work, the human elements change their characteristics; they adapt to 
the functional characteristics of the working system, and they modify system characteristics to 
serve their particular needs and preferences” (Rasmussen, Petjerson & Goodstein, 1994).  
Although the affect of a central agency is particularly acute in command and control scenarios 
(by their very nature there are shared goals, an organisational infrastructure, set procedures 
and so forth) they still cannot precisely specify many of the emergent properties that arise 
from this 'unspecified' adaptation, nor arguably, the multiplicative effects of synergy.  It can 
be stated that the type and structure of many emergent properties, such as SA, team-working 
and communication, arises as much out of ‘unspecified adaptation’ as it does from structural or procedural determinates of a system.  It can also be stated that many of these systems level 
phenomena cannot be traced back in their entirety to an individual agent, therefore precluding 
them from analysis with the majority of Human Factors techniques.   
The Event Analysis for Systemic Teamwork (EAST) method provides a means to undertake 
an analysis of any command and control scenario from a systems perspective and to 
characterise some of the emergent properties alluded to above (e.g. Stanton et al., 2005; 
Walker et al., In Press a & b).  The locus of the current article is around an EAST analysis of 
military command and control but the results are situated within a wider context.  This is 
achieved by comparing the military domain with EAST analyses carried out previously in the 
civilian domain (specifically Air Traffic Control and energy distribution).  The defining 
features of these two classes of scenario is that one, military command and control, does not 
embody the principles of Networked Enabled Capability (NEC), whereas the other, civilian 
command and control, does.  The current paper undertakes an exploration and analysis of four 
properties that can be said to be (to some extent at least) emergent, namely: SA, team-
working, communications and system reconfigurability.  The results are intended to provide 
an illustration of the network-based EAST method outputs; SA relates to the outputs of 
knowledge networks, team-working relates to the outputs of task networks, and 
communications relates to the outputs of social networks.   
DESCRIPTION OF OBSERVED MILITARY SCENARIO 
Sources of Data 
The study team collected data for the EAST analysis from the following: 
•  Observation of Command And Staff Training (CAST) exercises at the British Army’s 
Land Warfare Centre in Warminster between 11
th and 15
th July 2005. •  Observation of military decision making and planning training on the 2
nd and 3
rd 
August 2005 at the Land Warfare Centre in Warminster. 
•  Observation of a Fire Power Demonstration on the 11
th October 2005 at the British 
Army’s range on Salisbury Plain.  
The majority of the observed scenarios took place in a Battlegroup command post set up on-
site.  A team of analysts and a subject matter expert monitored and transcribed video and 
audio feeds from a remote location.  Key personnel active in the scenario were further 
interviewed at key points in the scenario using the Critical Decision Method (Klein & 
Armstrong, 2005). 
The Combat Estimate 
The observed scenarios were subsumed by a military planning process called The Combat 
Estimate (MoD, 2005b).  This describes the process by which “an adequate and flexible plan 
is developed in a reasonable amount of time” (MoD, 2005b).  In summary form the Combat 
Estimate is described in terms of ‘seven questions’, by which the process itself is often 
referred.  These are as follows:  
Question 1 – “What is the enemy doing and why?” 
Question 2 – “What have I been told to do and why?” 
Question 3 – “What effects do I want to have on the enemy and what direction must I 
give to develop my plan?” 
Question 4 – “Where can I best accomplish each action/effect?” 
Question 5 – “What resources do I need to accomplish each action/effect?” 
Question 6 – “When and where do the actions take place in relation to each other?” Question 7 – “What control measures do I need to impose?” 
In broad terms, Questions 1 and 2 are concerned with the development of situational 
awareness/understanding about the spatial configuration of the battlespace, and of mission 
objectives.  Question’s 4 to 7, in equally broad terms, can be subsumed under the heading 
'Course of Action Development'.  As mentioned above, the observed military scenario(s) 
cannot be said to conform to an NEC paradigm.  The enactment of the Combat Estimate 
technique is supported by a rudimentary (although undeniably robust) technological 
infrastructure; namely paper maps, acetate overlays, written materials and radio 
communications.  Figure 1 shows how the main phases of activity, and the seven individual 
‘questions’ of the Combat Estimate, relate to each other functionally and temporally.  The 
diagram is called a ‘task network’ and is based on the higher level goal structure of a 
comprehensive Hierarchical Task Analysis (carried out as the first stage of an EAST 
analysis).  
  
Figure 1 – Task network for the observed military command and control scenario.   
DESCRIPTION OF THE EAST METHOD 
The EAST method is based on the integration of seven individual Ergonomics methods.   
Methods integration of this kind has a number of compelling advantages; not only does it 
bring reassurance in terms of a validation history, but it also enables the same data to be analysed from multiple perspectives.  These multiple perspectives are argued to be inherent in 
any joint cognitive system, and indeed, are required to be analysed in order to extract and 
describe the non-apparent emergent properties that arise from such systems.   
The following individual methods combine to form EAST: Hierarchical Task Analysis (HTA: 
Annett, 2005 [see Figure 1 above]), Coordination Demand Analysis (CDA: Burke, 2005), 
Communications Usage Diagram (CUD: Watts & Monk, 2000), Social Network Analysis 
(SNA: Driskall & Mullen 2005), Knowledge Networks (KN: e.g. Ogden, 1987) and an 
enhanced form of Operation Sequence Diagram (OSD: Kirwan & Ainsworth, 1992).  The 
component methods link to each other (procedurally) in the manner shown below in Figure 2.  
The primary outputs of EAST are network based, they take the form of Task Networks, Social 
Networks and Knowledge Networks (Figure 3).  The interplay between these networks 
provides a number of compelling insights into the systems level emergent properties of 
command and control scenarios, and forms the structure for the current article.  
Figure 2 – Structure of the EAST method.   
 
Figure 3 – Conceptualisation of the EAST method’s network based outputs (and 
linkages between them) FINDINGS 
Data Derived from the Task Network (Team-working) 
The task analysis is used, in this case, to extract and compare emergent properties related to 
team-working.  It might be assumed that command and control scenarios will be dominated 
by coordination activities, but this supposition needs to be checked using the Coordination 
Demand Analysis (CUD) method (Burke, 2005).  Individual tasks from the HTA were 
categorised and scored against the CDA taxonomy of: communication, situational awareness, 
decision making, mission analysis, leadership, adaptability and assertiveness (Burke, 2005).  
Each CDA taxonomy item is scored from 1 to 3 where 1 is low coordination and 3 is high 
coordination.  From these individual scores a ‘total coordination’ figure can be derived (based 
on the mean of the component scores).   
Overall, the mean total coordination score for the military scenario is 1.6 (out of a maximum 
score of three).  Despite large differences in the command structure and supporting technical 
infrastructure, total coordination in the military scenario appears to be comparable to both 
civilian (NEC) examples.  Where military and civilian scenarios differ is in the relative 
proportions of task and teamwork activities.  Task work is performed in isolation, teamwork 
requires coordination with others.  The military scenario shows an almost even split 
(48%/52% respectively), which differs from air traffic control scenarios (more autonomous 
working with a 65/35 split respectively) and energy distribution (more team-working, with a 
30/70 split respectively).  For additional probity the mean co-ordination score was also 
calculated for the seven main stages of the HTA (these represent temporal phases in the 
military scenario) and the results are shown in Table 1.  
Table 1 – CDA analysis results according to task phase 
Category 
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Mean  Comms  2.5  2 2.2    2 3 
Mean  SA  2 2 2.2    2 2 
Mean  DM    1.5 1.8   1  2 
Mean  MA  1 2 2.1    1 1 
Mean  Leadership  1.25  1.3 1.6   2  3 
Mean  Adaptability    2 2   3 2 
Mean Assertiveness      1.8    1  2 
Total  Coordination  1.7 1.8 2.0 0  1.7 2.1 
 
The scores for the individual coordination dimensions vary across the full range of 
permissible values, from one through to three.  It can be noted that communications and 
situation awareness score consistently high, whereas decision making scores relatively low.  
This pattern differs from civilian examples in which the decision making and planning phases 
tend to occur concurrently and continuously (as opposed to a discreet stage).  As a result, 
coordination scores remain stable across task phase.  Based on these results the supposition 
that command and control activities have a prominent team-working component is justified, 
but different domains (NEC versus non-NEC) possess different teamwork characteristics. 
Data Derived from Social Network Analysis (Reconfigurability and Communications)    
Social network analysis is a means to present and describe the underlying network structure of 
individuals or teams who are linked through communications (Driskell & Mullen, 2005).  
Social networks focus “[…] on the relationships among actors embedded in their social context” (Driskell & Mullen, 2005, p. 58-1).  Social networks can be used in a novel way to 
try and represent the technological mediation of communication, and joint cognitive systems 
in which some of the nodes are non-human.  The resulting network (Figure 4) can be subject 
to mathematical analysis using Graph Theory (Driskell & Mullen, 2005) to derive two 
numerical indices: ‘centrality’ (a numeric ranking allowing key agents in the network to be 
identified) and ‘density’ (the interconnectivity of the network as a whole).  Both of these 
metrics can be understood in relation to other contextual factors to enable judgements to be 
made about what aspects of the network configuration constrain or enhance performance.  
The metrics, being emergent properties of the networks as well as a means to simplify them, 
permit easy comparison between alternate domains. 
 
Figure 4 – Social network for the military command and control scenario showing how 
agents in the scenario are configured in relation to each other and the communications 
links that exist between them.  System Reconfigurability 
The social network is dynamic and reconfigurable; different nodes and links become active 
under different activity stereotypes.  Activity is defined and modelled by the Task Network 
above and the network reconfigures itself as follows: 
•  Briefing or providing direction: the Commander is directing communications 
and information outwards to subordinate staff in a prescribed and tightly 
coupled manner (particularly Questions 1 and 3 of the Combat Estimate 
planning technique). 
•  Reviewing: the planning staff communicate in a more collaborative manner, 
with mutual exchange of information and ad-hoc usage of planning materials 
and outputs (in particular Questions 2 and 5 of the Combat Estimate). 
•  Semi-autonomous working: members of the headquarters are working 
individually on assigned tasks and become relatively loosely coupled in terms 
of communication.  The communication channels remain open but are used in 
an ad-hoc, un-prescribed manner (this occurs at various points in all phases of 
the Combat Estimate). 
The temporal and task based activation of agents and communications, in which they assume 
different stereotypical configurations, is illustrated in Figure 5.   Briefing Reviewing Semi-Autonomous 
Working  
Figure 5 – Illustration of the changing configuration of the social network in respect to 
three distinct activity stereotypes (to be read in conjunction with figure 3). 
Communications 
Figure 4 also illustrates the communications media that facilitate the links between nodes in 
the network.  These are formally defined by the CUD method and summarised in Table 2 as a 
communications/modality/technology matrix.  Shading indicates where a specific 
communications technology is crossed with a specific modality.  The matrix appears to be 
relatively simple in the military scenarios, being dominated by verbal communication.  The 
trade-off is towards robustness (a highly desirable feature in military contexts).  Similar 
robustness might be regarded as a redundant and indeed inefficient feature in civilian 
contexts.  Clearly, there are opportunities to, for example, more rapidly acquire the state of 
SA through novel technology that does not necessarily rely on verbal communications and 
manual updating of maps.  Such a system is realised in the civilian examples of air traffic 
control and energy distribution, in which the resulting social networks show, in comparison, a 
much denser interconnection between actors using a more diverse array of technology. 
Table 2 – Technology/Facilitation/Modality Matrix.  Shading Represents a Match 
Between Communications Technology and Communications Modality  Technology/Facilitation 
Modality Radio Planning  Aids In-Person  Voice 
Verbal       
Visual      
Written      
 
Calculation of Social Network Metrics 
The 'most central agents' are revealed by network mathematics to be the planning/principal 
staff, followed by the commanding officer and COS/2IC (Table 3).  In NEC scenarios it might 
be anticipated that the spread of centrality scores will be less pronounced as a result of greater 
interconnectivity and information sharing; this is certainly evident in both civilian examples.  
Further in depth analysis would reveal whether the uneven spread of centrality scores in the 
military domain is a favourable reflection of command (and authority) or a potentially risky 
situation in which information bottlenecks arise.  The network density figure of 0.31 is 
suggestive of a moderate level of connectivity within the network, and is again comparable 
with both civilian examples.  Perhaps the point here is that the total number of available 
communications links is more or less the same, but that they are configured differently in 
NEC paradigms. 
Table 3 -  Network metrics illustrating centrality (key agents in the scenario) and density 
(network connectivity) for the social network as a whole. 
Agent Agent  Centrality 
Higher Formation  0.89 
Commanding Officer  1.11 
COS/2IC 1.11 
Ancillary Staff  0.67 
Planning/Principal Staff  1.33 
Sub Units  0.22 
Planning Materials & Outputs  0.67 
NETWORK DENSITY  0.31 
 
The change in network density for each activity stereotype is also indicative of a high degree 
of reconfigurability. Table 4 presents the centrality results reflecting the different ways in which the network is configured.  This appears to be a relatively unique feature of military 
command and control.  One possible explanation is that a high degree of flexibility, the need 
to adapt to new situations and a discrete planning phase, arises out of the range of possible 
military effects combined with the dynamism of the operational context.  In comparison, the 
civilian examples are working within (relatively) tightly constrained environments, with the 
emphasis very much upon ‘minimising system disturbances’, ‘maintaining equilibrium’ and 
‘maximising safety’.  A more static configuration of people and technology may be desirable 
in such circumstances. 
Table 4 – Network metrics illustrating centrality (key agents in the scenario) and density 
(network connectivity) for the activity stereotypes of Briefing, Reviewing and Semi-
Autonomous Working. 
  Centrality 
Agent  Briefing Reviewing  Semi-Autonomous 
Higher Formation       
Commanding Officer  0.33  0.67  0.33 
COS/2IC 0.11  0.67  0.33 
Ancillary Staff  0.11  0.33  0.33 
Planning/Principal Staff  0.11  0.67  0.33 
Sub Units       
Planning Materials   0.33  0.67 
NETWORK DENSITY  0.03  0.20  0.13 
 
Data Derived from Knowledge Networks (Systems Level SA) 
From the CDM interview it is possible to construct Knowledge Networks (an example of 
which is shown in Figure 6) to show the knowledge that is related to the scenario.  The 
network consists of a set of nodes that represent sources of information, agents and objects 
that are linked through specific causal paths (for example, the object [situation] 'has' the 
property of [updates] associated with it, and so on).  As mentioned earlier, these knowledge 
objects are extracted from the CDM transcripts using content analysis.  The deeper, more 
fundamental concept that this method refers to is, of course, SA.  The advantage of the knowledge network approach is that it represents a way of modelling the knowledge that 
comprises the state of SA from an individual as well as systems perspective.  In addition, 
because it is network based, it meshes with the social and task networks that form the basis 
for the rest of the EAST method.  From the knowledge network it is possible to identify:  the 
structure and temporal nature of distributed SA (explained in full in Stanton et al., In Press), 
and the knowledge underpinning decision making. 
 
Figure 6 – Illustration of knowledge network representing a systems level view of 
knowledge but also temporally activated knowledge for a particular task phase (shaded 
objects).  The overall network is presented for illustration; the ‘zoomed’ section shows a 
small section in detail. 
The summary table (Table 5) uses simple graph theory metrics to summarise the visually 
complex network(s) into a more tractable form.  Based on an analysis of centrality, so-called 
'core knowledge objects' can be defined for each phase in the scenario (a CDM interview was 
carried out in relation to each phase, as was a separate knowledge network).  The table crosses each phase of the Combat Estimate planning technique with the list of core knowledge objects 
defined earlier.  Shading denotes specifically what knowledge objects are active in what 
phase.  These core knowledge objects also feed back up to the CUD method earlier.  Their 
prescription enables an analysis of what knowledge objects are shared between what agents 
and, therefore, require some form of communications technology to mediate the sharing.  In 
the CUD method the appropriateness of this match forms one aspect of the basis by which 
communications technology is, and can be, critiqued (see Walker et al In Press a for an in 
depth treatment of how this specific approach can be realised).  Such an approach has 
implications for the design and specification of NEC paradigms. 
Table 5 - Summary Table of Key Knowledge Objects Active Within Each Scenario.  
Shading Indicates What Knowledge is Specifically Active During What Stage of the 
Combat Estimate. 
Key Knowledge 
Objects 
Q1 Q2  &  3  Q4 Q5 Q6 Implementing 
Plan 
Subunits          
Plan            
Friendly forces             
Orders            
Situation             
Intention             
Capability           
Phases of battle             
Weapons          
Enemy            
Intelligence             
Effects           
Courses of action           
Uncertainty          
Terrain            
Position         
Tactics         
History          
Total Knowledge 
Objects 
9 12  6 8 13  10 
 
Eighteen key knowledge objects can be identified.  As the Combat Estimate planning process 
progresses through its distinct phases, it can be seen that the activation of these key objects changes.  This is indicative of changes in the type and structure of SA at the systems level  It 
can be seen that objects referring to uncertainty, terrain, position and tactics predominate in 
the early phase of the process, whereas intelligence and courses of action dominate later 
phases (with friendly forces, situation and enemy dominant throughout).  The advantage of 
this approach, certainly at this high level of analysis, is that it pinpoints the changing sources 
of information that actors in the scenario draw upon to develop SA.  Systems level SA, of the 
sort modelled by the knowledge network, is emergent to the extent that no one actor or agent 
has the property of ‘systemic SA’ residing within it.  It is a product of synergy and component 
interaction.  The more pragmatic benefits of such an approach is that it provides a new 
perspective on the specific knowledge based facets that personnel require training in.   
CONCLUSIONS  
Military command and control is a highly complex domain.  This paper, therefore, is 
necessarily couched at a summary level of analysis and based upon observation of three 
particular instances.  The results require interpretation with those caveats in place, but in so 
far as generalisations and characterisations can be made, the following emergent properties 
and issues have arisen from the current EAST analysis: 
1.  Military command and control relies heavily on tasks that require interaction with 
other team members, and where this is manifest, team-working is principally 
concerned with the communication of information and development of SA.  Thus, the 
task network can be seen to link to the knowledge  network.   
2.  A relatively simple, yet robust, technological infrastructure underpins team tasks.  It is 
heavily reliant on a combination of verbal communications and/or the translation of 
various planning 'products' into an integrated, collective, 4D spatial and temporal 
‘image’ of the battlespace.  It appears to be in this domain, based on the CUD method, that NEC technology has much to offer.  The assumption is that if the state of SA can 
be more rapidly and accurately acquired (and there seems little doubt that new 
technology offers this potential), then decision superiority can be achieved more 
quickly.  If SA can also be shared in optimal ways throughout the system (which 
again, new technology appears to provide for), then unity of effort can also be 
achieved.  
3.  The HTA specifies how the configuration of people and technology changes in a task 
and context dependant manner (thus the task network also links to the social network, 
and vice versa).  Three activity stereotypes are defined; semi-autonomous working, 
briefing and reviewing.  The network configures (and re-configures) itself numerous 
times during the enactment of the Combat Estimate.  As the network is re-configured, 
the constraints of it in terms of communications, density and centrality change.  The 
design of NEC paradigms, therefore, is revealed to be more than just a consideration 
of technology in isolation.  The specification of technology may be appropriate for one 
configuration, but inappropriate for another.  The combination of HTA and SNA 
appears to provide one route into addressing this issue. 
4.  The knowledge base that underpins effective SA at the systems level changes in 
response to task phase (linking knowledge networks to task networks), but also arises 
as a property of the constraining features of the configuration of people and 
technology (linking knowledge networks to social networks).  Systems level SA, at 
this summary level of analysis, appears to support and be congruent with task goals 
(as specified by the HTA). 
In summary, the emergent properties associated with military (and indeed any) command and 
control scenario relate to the interplay between task, social and knowledge networks.  An 
attempt has been made to illustrate that interplay as it relates to non-NEC military command and control whilst contextualising the results within a broader setting of civilian scenarios 
where NEC is already in place.   
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